Superior Court of California
County of El Dorado

1.       CONSERVATORSHIP OF CRASS  PP-1215

2^nd and Final Account and Report of Conservator.

     There are no original invoices or billing statements from the board and care facility in the court’s file. Such original statements are statutorily mandated. (Probate Code, § 2620(c)(5).)

TENTATIVE RULING # 1: APPEARANCES ARE REQUIRED AT 8:30 A.M. ON FRIDAY, MAY 2, 2008 IN DEPARTMENT NINE.

 

2.       MATTER OF THE EILEEN C. CLANCY LIVING TRUST  PP-20070068

(1)     Petition to Approve Stipulated Settlement.

(2)     1^st Account and Report of Ree Ann Wyly.

(3)     OSC Re: Dismissal.

Petition to Approve Stipulated Settlement.

     On April 10, 2007 petitioner Collette Remkes filed a petition for order confirming that she is the sole trustee of the Trust as of October 5, 2006 due to the settlor/initial trustee’s letter of resignation and appointment/nomination of her to serve as trustee of the Trust. Petitioner Remkes contended that respondent Wyly was never a successor trustee of the Trust and she engaged in improper conduct concerning Trust property purporting to be acting as successor trustee. Respondent Wyly contended that the settlor/initial trustee lacked the requisite legal capacity to execute the resignation and appointment letter on October 5, 2006 and, as a result, petitioner Remkes is not the duly appointed sole trustee of the Trust. Respondent Wyly contended she is the duly appointed and legal successor trustee of the Trust and she subsequently filed a 1^st Account seeking that it be approved and her conduct confirmed.

     The court set the underlying petition for a contested hearing.

     The parties settled the underlying petition and placed the settlement agreement on the record on December 11, 2007. The trial date was vacated. On April 4, 2008 the court approved the settlement appointing Jeff Quentmeyer as trustee of the Trust, designating certain real property as a Trust asset, directing that Collette Remkes sign a verification under penalty of perjury that the information she provided in her account is true and correct, and reserving the issue of the scope of the written general mutual release and waiver of claims. The court set a further hearing concerning the release and waiver of claims for May 2, 2008.

     Respondent Wyly objects to the language of paragraph 1 of the petitioner’s proposed mutual release, which provides: “In consideration of the mutual agreements of the parties contained in the stipulated settlement, each of the parties hereby releases and forever discharges the other party, both in individual and representative capacity, her heirs, successors (including specifically successor trustees), assigns, agents, and attorneys from any and all claims, demands, actions, damages, judgments, and attorney’s fees, whether civil or criminal, arising from or based upon the Released Matters.”

     Respondent contends that the language impermissibly extends the release to petitioner’s and respondent’s conduct as an agent of Ms. Clancy and seeks to limit the release to only those matters specifically described in the stipulated settlement agreement. She further contends that the language effectively eliminates respondent’s ability to seek attorney fees pursuant to the stipulated agreement and further releases petitioner Remkes from criminal liability. Respondent contends that these matters were not discussed or contemplated in settlement.

     Respondent Wyly further objects to portions of paragraph 3 of the petitioner’s proposed mutual release, which relates to waiver of Civil Code, § 1542. Paragraph 3 provides that the agreement is “intended to be a complete release of any an all claims of every type, present or future, known or unknown, arising out of or pertaining to the Released Matters…” Respondent contends that the language expands the matters released far beyond the subject matter of the litigation.

     Respondent Wyly proposes that the sentence state: “…intended to be a complete release of all matters addressed in the Stipulated Settlement agreement, all claims, present or future, known or unknown, arising out of or pertaining to the matters addressed…”

     Respondent Wyly further objects to paragraph 4 of the petitioner’s proposed mutual release, which provides: “Each party hereto acknowledges that the significance and consequence of her waiver of California Civil Code Section 1542 is that, even if she should eventually accrue additional claims or causes of action against a party hereto individually or in a fiduciary capacity, including, but not limited to, their respective officers, directors, agents, servants, employees, predecessors, successors, administrators, trustees, accountants, lawyers, appraisers, heirs and assigns relating to the Related Matters, she will not be able to make claims for those damages. Each party hereto consciously intends such a bar against claims, even as to claims for damages that may exist as of the date of this agreement or hereafter accrue, but which she does not know to exist, and which, if known, would materially affect her decision to execute this Agreement, regardless of whether her lack of knowledge is the result of ignorance, oversight, error, negligence or any other cause.” Respondent Wyly argues that this is an attempt to expand the Section 1542 waiver to matters and individuals not contemplated, discussed, or agreed.

     Respondent Wyly further objects to paragraph 5 of the petitioner’s proposed mutual release, which provides: “By entering into this agreement, the parties acknowledge that they have completely resolved any disputes between them relating to the Released Matters.”

     Respondent Wyly also objects to paragraph 6 of the petitioner’s proposed mutual release, which provides: “No further action is contemplated or will be taken by any party hereto as a result of any matter, conduct, or omission of any party hereto which has transpired with respect to any matter relating to the Released Matters.”

     Respondent argues that paragraphs 5 and 6 of the petitioner’s proposed mutual release are unacceptable, because they refer to “Released Matters”, rather than being limited to matters stipulated.

     Petitioner Remkes responded to the objections and essentially contends that a general release by it’s nature is broad and that respondent is impermissibly attempting to narrow the release such that respondent’s proposed release is not a general release, which is contrary to the parties’ agreement.

     The settlement agreement placed on the record in open court on December 11, 2007 provided: “The parties will enter into a general mutual release and a 1542 waiver.” (Transcript of Proceedings on December 11, 2007, page 3, lines 13-14.)

     Petitioner Remkes acknowledged she had an opportunity to consult with her counsel about the settlement agreement and expressly agreed to the terms of the settlement, including the general mutual release with a Section 1542 waiver. (Transcript of Proceedings on December 11, 2007, page 5, lines 15-25.) Respondent Wyly acknowledged she had an opportunity to consult with her counsel about the settlement agreement and expressly agreed to the terms of the settlement, including the general mutual release with a Section 1542 waiver. (Transcript of Proceedings on December 11, 2007, page 5, line 26 to page 7, line 1.)

     “An obligation is extinguished by a release therefrom given to the debtor by the creditor, upon a new consideration, or in writing, with or without new consideration.” (Civil Code, § 1541.)

     “A general release does not extend to claims which the creditor does not know or suspect to exist in his or her favor at the time of executing the release, which if known by him or her must have materially affected his or her settlement with the debtor.” (Civil Code, § 1542.)

     The court notes that “Released Matters” are defined in petitioner’s proposed Mutual Release as: “… all disputes existing between them pertaining to the EILEEN C. CLANCY LIVING TRUST (the “Trust”), its administration through the last date hereof, any assets of EILEEN C. CLANCY held outside the Trust, the accountings provided by the parties, the personal care of EILEEN C. CLANCY, and any other matter which is the subject of litigation between the parties described above (the “Released Matters”).”

     The court further notes that respondent Wyly’s opposition and amended opposition to Ms. Remkes' underlying petition at paragraph 17 raises issues concerning Ms. Wyly as agent for Ms. Clancy to make health care decisions under an advance health care directive and power of attorney for health care. The court also notes that respondent Wyly’s opposition and amended opposition makes reference in paragraph 5 that there existed a springing durable power of attorney naming petitioner Remkes and respondent Wyly as co-attorneys-in-fact.

     The court notes that in petitioner Remkes' declaration filed on June 29, 2007, she declares at paragraph 11 that when she discovered Ms. Wyly was named on Ms. Clancy’s health care directive as the agent to make health care decisions, she asked respondent Wyly about the appointment. She further declared that Ms. Wyly explained that Ms. Clancy understood the documents as only covering life and death decisions. Petitioner Remkes declared that she continued to make day-to-day and regular medical decisions for Ms. Clancy under a Springing Durable Power of Attorney document executed by Ms. Clancy.

     It would appear from the pleadings in opposition and evidence submitted by petitioner Remkes that disputes related to respondent’s conduct as an agent of Ms. Clancy was fairly raised in this matter and was encompassed in the settlement of the underlying petition.

     In addition, the issue of respondent’s attorney fees was expressly provided for in the settlement agreement placed on the record. The parties expressly agreed: “Ree Ann Wyly may petition the Court for payment of her attorney fees. Any objections to that petition, the attorney’s fees for those objections will be picked up by the party who is bringing the objection.” (Transcript of Proceedings on December 11, 2007, page 3, lines 18-21.) A general mutual release when harmonized with the settlement agreement would not release Ms. Wyly’s claim for attorney fees. The parties expressly agreed the court would determine the issue related to entitlement and the amount of attorney fees recoverable by respondent in a petition proceeding.

     It also appears from the use of the language “general mutual release” and 1542 “waiver” the parties intended to have a broad, mutual release, which encompassed all known and unknown claims the parties had or may have had related to the dispute raised by the litigation of the underlying petition. The term “general release” was not limited to the stipulated items discussed in the settlement agreement on the record, as respondent Wyly contends. Respondent argues that the parties intended the term “general mutual release” with a Section 1542 waiver would only result in a narrow, specific release of only the specific items stipulated on the record. Such an interpretation would not appear to be reasonable under the language and the circumstances of a settlement of the underlying litigation of the subject petition.

 1^st Account and Report of Ree Ann Wyly. 

     Respondent Ree Ann Wyly submits a 1^st account and report as the purported successor trustee of the Eileen C. Clancy Revocable Trust (Trust). Respondent Wyly seeks to have the court settle and approve the accounting and confirm and approve respondent Wyly’s conduct purportedly as the successor trustee of the Trust. According to the Account and Report, the accounting period apparently commences some unidentified date in March 2007 and terminates September 30, 2007. (Account and Report, paragraph 9 and Exhibit A.)

     On the other hand, on April 10, 2007 petitioner Collette Remkes filed a petition for order confirming that she is the sole trustee of the Trust as of October 5, 2006 due to the settlor/initial trustee’s letter of resignation and appointment/nomination of her to serve as trustee of the Trust. Petitioner Remkes contends that respondent Wyly was never a successor trustee of the Trust and she engaged in improper conduct concerning Trust property purporting to be acting as successor trustee. In other words, the petition that commenced this litigation raises issues as to the propriety of respondent Wyly’s conduct as the purported successor trustee and contends she never had any power to act as successor trustee. Respondent Wyly contends that the settlor/initial trustee lacked the requisite legal capacity to execute the resignation and appointment letter on October 5, 2006 and, as a result, petitioner Remkes is not the duly appointed sole trustee of the Trust. Respondent Wyly contends she is the duly appointed and legal successor trustee of the Trust.

     Trial on the issue of who is the proper successor trustee was set for trial. A foundational finding that must be made in order to approve and settle a trustee’s account and confirm and approve a trustee’s conduct concerning the operation of a Trust is that the person submitting the account is the true and proper trustee of that Trust. In light of the pending litigation on that exact issue, the court can not reach the merits of the accounting submitted until after the underlying petition is tried and determined. Should respondent Wyly be determined to be a trustee of the Trust after trial of the petition, the court could properly reach the merits of the accounting. Should the court after trial determine she was never a trustee, as argued by petitioner Remkes, then it would not appear appropriate to approve and confirm what respondent Wyly did in relation to the Trust. The hearing on this account was continued until after the scheduled trial date of the underlying petition.

     The parties subsequently settled the underlying petition and placed the settlement agreement on the record. The trial date was vacated. On April 4, 2008 the court approved the settlement appointing Jeff Quentmeyer as trustee of the Trust, designating certain real property as a Trust asset, directing that Collette Remkes sign a verification under penalty of perjury that the information she provided in her account is true and correct, and reserving the issue of the scope of the written general mutual release and waiver of claims. The court set a further hearing concerning the release and waiver of claims for May 2, 2008.

     Inasmuch as there remains an issue concerning the release and waiver, the court is not in a position to rule on the accounting of Ree Ann Wyly. Until the scope of the release and waiver is finalized, the issue of the validity of alleged trusteeship of Ree Ann Wyly may, or may not, still be at issue.

OSC Re: Dismissal.

     The underlying petition was settled on the record on December 11, 2007 and with the exception of the release/waiver issues, the settlement was approved by the court on April 4, 2008. There is no request to dismiss the petition in the court’s file.

TENTATIVE RULING # 2: APPEARANCES ARE REQUIRED AT 8:30 A.M. ON FRIDAY, MAY 2, 2008 IN DEPARTMENT NINE.

 

3.       CONSERVATORSHIP OF DUCHATEAU  PP-1339

Review Hearing Re: Conservatorship.

     On June 20, 2003 the court found the conservatorship estate qualified as a small estate and waived the accounting requirement. The court investigator recommends continuance of the conservatorship.

TENTATIVE RULING # 3: ABSENT OBJECTIONS, THE CONSERVATORSHIP SHALL CONTINUE. THE COURT SETS A REVIEW HEARING RE: CONSERVATORSHIP FOR 8:30 A.M. ON FRIDAY, MAY 8, 2009 IN DEPARTMENT NINE.

 

4.       CONSERVATORSHIP OF LACHAPELLE  PP-20000042

Review Hearing Re: Conservatorship.

     On July 24, 2000 the court executed and entered it’s order appointing a limited conservatorship of the person and estate and waived the bond requirement due to the small conservatorship estate. The accounting requirement is also waived, provided the conservatorship estate remains such that it qualifies as a small estate as defined in Probate Code, § 2628(b). The court investigator recommends continuance of the conservatorship.

TENTATIVE RULING # 4: ABSENT OBJECTIONS, THE CONSERVATORSHIP SHALL CONTINUE. THE COURT SETS A REVIEW HEARING RE: CONSERVATORSHIP FOR 8:30 A.M. ON FRIDAY, MAY 7, 2010 IN DEPARTMENT NINE. (SEE PROBATE CODE, § 1850.5(a).)

 

5.       CONSERVATORSHIP OF GUINN  PP-933037

Review Hearing Re: Conservatorship.

     This matter involves a conservatorship of the person only. The court investigator recommends continuance of the conservatorship.

TENTATIVE RULING # 5: ABSENT OBJECTIONS, THE CONSERVATORSHIP SHALL CONTINUE. THE COURT SETS A REVIEW HEARING RE: CONSERVATORSHIP FOR 8:30 A.M. ON FRIDAY, MAY 8, 2009 IN DEPARTMENT NINE.

 

6.       CONSERVATORSHIP OF MARTIN  PP-940073

Review Hearing Re: Conservatorship.

     On March 14, 1995 a conservatorship of the person and estate was ordered established. Bond was waived due to the small conservatorship estate. Apparently the estate consists of income from public benefits. The accounting requirement is waived, provided the conservatorship estate remains such that it qualifies as a small estate as defined in Probate Code, § 2628(b).

     A supplemental report from the court investigator was filed, which raises an issue concerning the conservator’s physical ability to care for the conservatee due to a recent illness and hospitalization. Apparently the Public Guardian has become involved and a petition for appointment of successor conservator is contemplated, which the conservator apparently opposes. There is no record in the court’s files that the Public Guardian has filed a petition. The court investigator states that appointment of the Public Guardian as successor conservator may be appropriate.

     The court appoints the Public Defender as counsel for the conservatee and continues the matter to 1:30 p.m. on Thursday, May 29, 2008 in Department Nine.

TENTATIVE RULING # 6: THIS MATTER IS CONTINUED TO 1:30 P.M. ON THURSDAY, MAY 29, 2008 IN DEPARTMENT NINE. THE PUBLIC DEFENDER’S OFFICE AND PUBLIC GUARDIAN ARE TO BE PROVIDED NOTICE.

 

7.       CONSERVATORSHIP OF MCCAULEY  PP-9727

Review Hearing Re: Conservatorship.

     This matter involves a limited conservatorship of the person only. The court investigator recommends continuance of the conservatorship.

TENTATIVE RULING # 7: ABSENT OBJECTIONS, THE CONSERVATORSHIP SHALL CONTINUE. THE COURT SETS A REVIEW HEARING RE: CONSERVATORSHIP FOR 8:30 A.M. ON FRIDAY, MAY 7, 2010 IN DEPARTMENT NINE. (SEE PROBATE CODE, § 1850.5(a).)

 

8.       ESTATE OF ROBERTS  PP-20060081

Issues Conference.

     There remains pending a petition to determine community property interest in certain real property of the estate. On January 18, 2008 the court ordered that the trial on the issue concerning construction of the settlement agreement severed from the trial of the remaining issues raised in the petition. The court further stayed proceedings on the remaining issues pending trial of the settlement agreement construction issue and reserved ruling on the issue of whether or not the community property interest matter should be determined as a civil action, rather than as a probate petition. A one day trial is set for May 9, 2008.

TENTATIVE RULING # 8: APPEARANCES ARE REQUIRED AT 8:30 A.M. ON FRIDAY, MAY 2, 2008 IN DEPARTMENT NINE.

 

9.       ESTATE OF KIM  PP-20020087

(1)     Petition to Appoint Successor Personal Representative.

(2)     Petition for Authority to Withdraw Funds from Blocked Account.

Petition to Appoint Successor Personal Representative.

     Decedent’s father was appointed personal representative of this intestate estate and Letters of Administration were issued on January 31, 2003. Decedent left no issue and the whereabouts of the decedent’s birth mother is unknown. On October 15, 2004 the judgment of final distribution was entered, which ordered distribution of ½ of the estate to decedent’s father and ½ of the estate to decedent’s mother. The decedent’s mother’s share was ordered to be held in a blocked account for a period of 5 years in order to allow her to claim her distribution. The judgment of final distribution further designated alternate distributees of the decedent’s mother’s distribution should she fail to claim her share of the estate within five years pursuant to Probate Code, § 11603(c). The court has been informed that the personal representative has passed away.

     Decedent’s step-mother petitions for appointment as successor personal representative on the ground that the personal representative passed away on January 19, 2008. The petition states that distribution to the decedent’s father, the deceased personal representative, was accomplished and all that remains is to file estate tax returns and await the decedent’s mother’s claim prior to the expiration of five years from the date of the judgment of distribution, or distribution to the named alternate distributees upon expiration of five years.

     “If a vacancy occurs in the office of a personal representative and there are no other personal representatives, the court shall appoint a successor personal representative.” (Probate Code, § 8522(a).) “Appointment of a successor personal representative shall be made on petition and service of notice on interested persons in the manner provided in Article 2 (commencing with Section 8110) of Chapter 2, and shall be subject to the same priority as for an original appointment of a personal representative. The personal representative of a deceased personal representative is not, as such, entitled to appointment as successor personal representative.” (Probate Code, § 8522(b).)

     Notice was served on the petitioner and the alternate distributees designated in the judgment of final distribution.

     The petitioner has filed an executed a statement of duties and liabilities. (Judicial Council Form DE-147.) (Probate Code, § 8404(a).) In addition, the petitioner has filed the confidential statement of birth date and driver’s license number as mandated by Probate Code, § 8404(b) and Local Rule 10.12.15. (Judicial Council Form DE-147S.)

     It appears appropriate under the circumstances to grant the petition. Inasmuch as the assets of the estate remain in a blocked account, a bond will not be required.

Petition for Authority to Withdraw Funds from Blocked Account.

     The person petitioning for appointment as successor personal representative seeks a court order releasing $1,500 to reimburse court filing fees, reimburse accountant fees for tax returns for tax years 2004, 2005, and 2006, and to pay for preparation of the 2007 tax return.

     It would appear appropriate to grant this petition.

TENTATIVE RULING # 9: ABSENT OBJECTIONS, THE PETITION TO APPOINT SUCCESSOR PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE IS GRANTED. ABSENT OBJECTIONS, THE PETITION TO AUTHORIZE WITHDRAWAL OF $1,500 FROM BLOCKED ACCOUNTS IS GRANTED. THE COURT SETS A REVIEW HEARING RE: DISTRIBUTION OF ESTATE FOR 8:30 A.M. ON FRIDAY, JANUARY 22, 2010 IN DEPARTMENT NINE.

 

10.   CONSERVATORSHIP OF LAWSON  PP-20030060

Conservatee’s Petition to Terminate Conservatorship.

TENTATIVE RULING # 10: UPON REQUEST OF PETITIONER, THIS MATTER IS CONTINUED TO 8:30 A.M. ON FRIDAY, MAY 16, 2008 IN DEPARTMENT NINE.

 

11.   ESTATE OF KURTH  PP-20080045

Petition to Admit Will to Probate.

     The decedent’s son petitions to admit a holographic instrument as his mother’s will and seeks an order appointing his spouse, the decedent’s daughter-in-law, as personal representative. The two intestate heirs have executed waivers of the bond requirement.

     The proposed personal representative has not filed an executed a statement of duties and liabilities. (Judicial Council Form DE-147.) Prior to issuing letters of administration, the personal representative, other than a trust company or public administrator, shall file an acknowledgement of receipt of a statement of duties and liabilities of the office of personal representative. The statement is a mandated Judicial Council form. (Probate Code, § 8404(a).) In addition, the proposed personal representative has not filed the confidential statement of birth date and driver’s license number as mandated by Probate Code, § 8404(b) and Local Rule 10.12.15. (Judicial Council Form DE-147S.)

     “A will that does not comply with Section 6110 is valid as a holographic will, whether or not witnessed, if the signature and the material provisions are in the handwriting of the testator.” (Probate Code, § 6111(a).)

     Although the document offered for admission to probate is signed as “Mom”, rather than as “Wileane Kurth” or “Willie Kurth”, it appears that such is a sufficient signature for the purposes of Section 6111(a).

     “Prob.C. 6111(a) requires that the signature be “in the handwriting of the testator.” It is not necessary that the legal or true name be signed. (Estate of Button (1930) 209 C. 325, 328, 287 P. 964 [letter concluded with words “Love from ‘Muddy’ ”; held equivalent to “Mother” and sufficient].)” (14 Witkin, Summary of California Law (10^th ed. 2005) Wills, § 152, page 224.)

     “…[S]everal cases illustrate that the way a testator signs a holographic will does not need to be identical to a signature used to sign other legal documents. In Estate of Morris (1969) 268 Cal.App.2d 638, 640, 74 Cal.Rptr. 32 (Morris), the court found that “[t]he use of the initials as a signature was an effective signing of the will. [Citations.]” The words, “Love from ‘Muddy’,” signed at the end of a holographic will in the form of a letter, were also considered a valid signature. (Estate of Button (1930) 209 Cal. 325, 328, 334, 287 P. 964 (Button).) And similarly, in Estate of Henderson (1925) 196 Cal. 623, 634, 238 P. 938 (Henderson), the court found the phrase “Your loving mother” constituted a valid signature. ¶ Morris, Button, and Henderson demonstrate that the name on a holographic will does not need to be a legal signature to validly authenticate the will.” (In re Estate of Williams (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 197, 210-211.)

     However, the holographic instrument has not been “proven”. “A holographic will may be proved in the same manner as other writings.” (Probate Code, § 8222.) There is no proof of holographic will declaration in the court’s file, which authenticates the handwriting and signature on the holographic will as being decedent’s. (Judicial Council Form DE-135.)

TENTATIVE RULING # 11: APPEARANCES ARE REQUIRED AT 8:30 A.M. ON FRIDAY, MAY 2, 2008 IN DEPARTMENT NINE.

 

12.   ESTATE OF HAMILTON  PP-1192

Review Hearing Re: Status of Administration.

     The order of final distribution was issued on July 20, 2007. Receipts of distribution executed by Sandra Burnham and the successors in interest to the Estate of John Broderick, Sr. are in the court’s file. The remaining beneficiaries are the decedent’s step-daughters, Wanda Dudney, Barbara Sewell and Patricia Miller. The bequests amount to $5.99 to each of the step-daughters. The court was informed prior to the last hearing on February 1, 2008 that the personal representative was having difficulty locating the three step-daughters to distribute the bequests and the matter was continued to this date. The court has not received any further word on the status of those distributions.

TENTATIVE RULING # 12: APPEARANCES ARE REQUIRED AT 8:30 A.M. ON FRIDAY, MAY 2, 2008 IN DEPARTMENT NINE.

 

13.   CONSERVATORSHIP OF KELLY  PP-20000040

Review Hearing Re: Conservatorship.

TENTATIVE RULING # 13: A REVIEW HEARING HAVING BEEN SET FOR SEPTEMBER 19, 2008, THIS MATTER IS DROPPED FROM THE CALENDAR. THE COURT INVESTIGATOR IS TO BE PROVIDED NOTICE.

 

14.   ESTATE OF BACKERT  PP-20060112

Review Hearing Re: Status of Administration.

     The order of final distribution was issued on April 20, 2007. Personal property and real property was to be distributed to the two heirs. Although there is an ex parte declaration and petition seeking final discharge in the court’s file, the declaration does not state that the order of distribution of real property was recorded or that all personal property was distributed, and there are no receipts of distribution in the court’s file. Therefore, the final discharge has not been ordered.

TENTATIVE RULING # 14: APPEARANCES ARE REQUIRED AT 8:30 A.M. ON FRIDAY, MAY 2, 2008 IN DEPARTMENT NINE.

 

15.   ESTATE OF BRYS  PP-20070044

Review Hearing Re: Status of Administration.

TENTATIVE RULING # 15: THE ORDER OF FINAL DISTRIBUTION HAVING BEEN ENTERED ON APRIL 18, 2008, THIS MATTER IS CONTINUED TO 8:30 A.M. ON FRIDAY, JULY 25, 2008 IN DEPARTMENT NINE.

 

16.   ESTATE OF MORRELL  PP-20070046

Review Hearing Re: Status of Administration.

     Letters of Administration were issued on April 27, 2007. The Final Inventory and Appraisal was filed on August 23, 2007. There is no final account and request for final distribution in the court’s file.

TENTATIVE RULING # 16: APPEARANCES ARE REQUIRED AT 8:30 A.M. ON FRIDAY, MAY 2, 2008 IN DEPARTMENT NINE.

 

17.   CONSERVATORSHIP OF GARRETT  PP-920127

Review Hearing Re: Conservatorship.

     On October 28, 1992 the court entered its order establishing a limited conservatorship of the person only. The court investigator recommends continuance of the conservatorship.

TENTATIVE RULING # 17: ABSENT OBJECTIONS, THE CONSERVATORSHIP SHALL CONTINUE. THE COURT SETS A REVIEW HEARING RE: CONSERVATORSHIP FOR 8:30 A.M. ON FRIDAY, MAY 7, 2010 IN DEPARTMENT NINE. (SEE PROBATE CODE, § 1850.5(a).)

 

18.   CONSERVATORSHIP OF CARTER  PP-9698

Review Hearing Re: Conservatorship.

TENTATIVE RULING # 18: ABSENT OBJECTIONS, THE CONSERVATORSHIP SHALL CONTINUE. THE COURT SETS A REVIEW HEARING RE: CONSERVATORSHIP FOR 8:30 A.M. ON FRIDAY, APRIL 24, 2009 IN DEPARTMENT NINE. THE REVIEW HEARING RE: 11^TH ACCOUNT IS CONFIRMED AS 8:30 A.M. ON FRIDAY, APRIL 24, 2009 IN DEPARTMENT NINE.